Janet E. Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006) by Bartow, Ann
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2008
Janet E. Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to
Take a Break from Feminism (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2006)
Ann Bartow
Pace Law School, abartow@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Law and Gender Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ann Bartow, Janet E. Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2006), 26 Windsor Y.B. on Access to Just. 391 (2008), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/808/.
JANET E. HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHYTO '£4KE 
ABREAKFROM FEMINISM (PRINCETON, N.J.: PRINCETON 
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2006) 
Ann M. Bartow* 
My overarching reaction to Janet Halley's recent book, Split Decisions: How and 
Why to Take a Break from Feminism, can be summarized with a one sentence cli-
che: The perfect is the enemy of the good. I She holds feminism to a standard of 
perfection no human endeavour could possibly meet, and then heartily criticizes 
it for falling short. Though Halley's myriad observations about feminism occa-
sionally resonated with my own views and experiences, ultimately I remain un-
convinced that taking a break from feminism would, for me, be either justified or 
productive. But I did (mostly) enjoy reading it. Halley is well read, cleverly pro-
vocative, and a gifted writer. Below I give a somewhat glib and superficial over-
view of the book, and my reactions to it. I explain why I think Halley is too hard 
on feminists generally, and on Catharine MacKinnon specifically. And I take her 
to task for being harshly critical of feminism without offering realistic, pragmatic, 
or lawyerly alternatives. You can't theorize your way into an abortion, or out of a 
rape. You can have to rely on a legal system that may fail you, in which case you 
can work to improve it so that others don't suffer as you did. This is part of the 
very essence of feminism, which Halley gives short shrift. 
I parsed Split Decisions the first time over a year ago in preparation for an "auth-
or meets reader" session with Halley at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the Law & 
Society Association in Berlin. There Halley was open to discussion of her book in 
a cordial and non-defensive way, which was a very pleasant surprise. Interviews 
I'd read with her about the book made her sound rather angry, and the book's 
introduction made her sound fearful and apprehensive about negative reactions 
the work would provoke. In consequence, some readers are gleefully anticipating 
the unleashing of a Feminist Flame War. Consider this closing paragraph of a re-
view by University of Saskatchewan philosophy professor George Williamson: 
Ultimately, Halley is saying what only a woman of impec-
cable feminist credentials could say. But even so, anyone fam-
iliar with the bitterness of feminist in-fighting must be pes-
simistic that even a balanced book such as this will be at all 
well-received, but rather is likely to be ferociously reviled and 
trashed.2 
Yes, per Williamson only a brilliant, impeccable feminist would urge others to 
take a break from actual feminism, and only poorly credentialed, unbalanced and 
ferocious feminists would disagree that this is necessary. If these are the binary 
School of Law, University of South Carolina. 
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options, put me squarely in the latter category. In fairness to Halley, Williamson 
seems to have missed Halley's description of herself as "only rarely and intermit-
tently feminist,"3 or perhaps he preferred to ignore any evidence that didn't fit his 
theory. In the chapter entitled "My Complete and Total Lack of Objectivity" Hal-
ley writes that she hoped she "won't promote any of the contestants of feminism 
against it,"4 but it seems clear later doing just this is part of what animates the pro-
ject. Yet she is self-doubting in some places, praises feminism in others, and ends 
that particular chapter with the words "I admit it's impossible to get this right."5 
Perhaps this is tacit acknowledgement that the perfect is the enemy of the good? 
No feminist theorist gets everything right all the time, any more than any other 
legal scholar. Nor does any feminist lawyer, or any lawyer. But feminism has done 
a lot of good for women, even as mistakes were made, and will be again. If this 
book turns people away from feminism that lacks perfection, can they achieve the 
same positive goals from the "splits between theories" where Halley would situate 
them? Can a judge or lawyer help anyone effectively without picking sides? Hal-
ley never really explains how this will all work out in practice. It probably would 
have been a lot more fun to discuss this with her over a good bottle of wine than it 
was to write this review essay. 
In case you hadn't noticed, I'm writing this book review mostly in the first per-
son singular, and in what I hope will be a jaunty and accessible manner, to echo 
Halley's linguistically playful approach in the book. Her charm, humour and fre-
quent fussy, self-deprecating qualifiers disarmed me initially. But Halley's gener-
ally friendly tone is belied by the violence of some of her language choices: splits; 
breaks; "beating back" the influence of Catharine A. MacKinnon; referring to 
some of her work as "the late MacKinnon" as if MacKinnon herself, as well as her 
influence, was dead; the deployment of the idiom "carrying a brief" for females 
(which connotes militant grudge holding); accusations of feminist "paranoia" 
and "bad faith;" characterization of challenging argument as "expert feminist at-
tacks;" references to feminism's "dark side," its "vanquished" and its "prisoners of 
war," and repeatedly, permutations of the visceral phrase "feminism with blood 
on its hands," which startled and offended me every time I read it. I think anyone 
who has ever done any work in favour of abortion rights has been accused ofhav-
ing bloody hands by those who oppose women's freedom of choice, and Halley is 
far too smart to have interjected the expression and imagery unintentionally. I'm 
not sure what she intended with this. I'll concede that she got my attention, but it 
came linked to my enmity. 
I also resented Halley's reference to much missed feminist law professor Mary 
Joe Frug, who was brutally stabbed and murdered in 1991 by a person or persons 
yet unknown, just a few sentences before angrily writing that "the CLS conference 
is dead,"6 killed, she suggests, by Robin West and "the late MacKinnon." I was 
lucky enough to hear Frug speak once, in the late 1980s when I was a law student, 
and I've read and appreciated her scholarship in the years since. Thinking about 
3 Supra note 1 at 15. 
4 Ibid. at 12. 
5 Supra note 3. 
6 Supra note 1 at 167. 
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what happened to her makes me want to weep, so I can only imagine what it is 
like for her friends and family. I don't much like it when people use her life or her 
death to make self-serving points about feminism. It is also unsettling that the 
MacKinnon references in this section of the book suggest that MacKinnon was a 
CLS conference participant, but a bit of research indicates this was not the case. 
That Halley implies she was and helped engineer the demise of the CLS confer-
ence is perplexing. 
Halley prefaces a number of her framing sentences with the phrase "cards-on-
the-table moment" as if the entire scholarly project was a high stakes poker game. 
Toward the end of the tome, where she analogizes feminism to an aging and blind 
but viciously barking dog,? the "bitch" slur we feminists hear all too common-
ly was perilously close to the surface. A couple of pages later she insultingly an-
thropomorphizes feminism as adults on a playground who rush up at a little girl 
who has scraped her knee on a playground and cause her to cry with aggressive 
expressions of concern. 8 Well, Janet Halley, if we are going to indulge in juvenile 
name calling, maybe feminism is rubber and you are glue, and whatever you say 
about feminism bounces back and sticks to you. 
Halley begins her book by arguing (in a chapter pithily entitled "The Argu-
ment," no less) that theory produces reality, and that politics, resource distribu-
tion and sexuality are deeply contingent on theory that is embedded within fem-
inism. The book, she says, is intended to alter reality by changing theory. And 
because Halley declares" This book--it's about sex," presumably Halley wants to 
change sex. You might therefore assume that the book has a highly charged erotic 
content. It doesn't, though. Instead it often reads like a memoir of someone who 
has abandoned a suddenly oppressive religion. Erotic sex is consigned to the "Sex 
2" labe1.9 "Converging" and "diverging" are iterated aspects of discourse rather 
than intercourse. And there aren't any pictures. 
Halley spends most of the book criticizing the writings of various femin-
ist theorists, mainly feminist legal theorists. She particularly derides the "late" 
and presumably current work of Catharine MacKinnon by contrasting it un-
favourably with MacKinnon's earlier writings, which Halley prefers. She seems 
to posit that over time, too much immersion in feminism made MacKinnon go 
wrong. I don't understand Halley's negative fixation with MacKinnon, which 
seems to transcend mere disagreement. She thanks MacKinnon for "generously 
provid[ing] substantive criticism of some pages" in her forward acknowledge-
ments, but nothing in the book indicates that Halley is involved in any kind of 
substantive academic dialogue with her. Though Halley praises MacKinnon for 
various insights, she seems intractably unwilling to admit that MacKinnon's in-
fluence is significant because she gets so many things right. 
One of the strengths oflegal academia as I experience it is that most of us can 
all get along, at least most of the time. So I don't think the antagonism is personal. 
But it is certainly powerful. Did Catharine MacKinnon's feminist legal theories 
somehow ruin Janet Halley's theoretical sex life? All we know for sure is that Hal-
7 Ibid. at 343. 
8 Ibid. at 346. 
9 Ibid. at 24. 
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ley says quite explicitly that if she could click her heels and become a gay man or 
a straight white male middle-class radical, she would do so in an instant.!O She 
never explicitly says that she feels feminism ruined being a woman for her, but at 
various junctures in the book, that's the implication I drew. What would her sex 
life be like without feminism? Taking a break from feminism puts one in a differ-
ent place than she would be if the feminist movement hadn't been successful in 
some regards. I'd have liked Halley to account for this. 
Oddly, Halley compliments MacKinnon for articulating what Halley calls the 
emancipatory method of consciousness-raising. Consciousness-raising fora are 
available to all women, inviting them to share details about their lives and recog-
nize that there are profound commonalities in women's experiences, across many 
kinds of differences such as age, race, and class, linked to their subordination as 
women. Halley wrote: 
In Second Signs, published in 1983, MacKinnon fully em-
braced the problem that women's knowledge of their re-
ality, their ability to see male dominance and to object to it 
for themselves, was relentlessly situated in male dominance. 
Boldly, she refused to explain the problem away on grounds 
of false consciousness ... or of the verity of any biological 
woman's experience ... attributing the paired objections to 
the object/subject polarity that feminism detects at the heart 
of male power.!! 
It seems like Halley understands the importance of conscientious bouts of con-
sciousness-raising as a feminist method. She also refers to MacKinnon's critique 
ofliberal feminism as her "best work," astutely noting that "[tlhe very idea that 
justice for women depends on a comparison of their life situation with that of 
men limits equality theories to the terms set by male dominance .... "!2 Butwhen 
she raises convergence as an evil and counterproductive facet of feminism, I won-
der if she grasps how important mapping and understanding commonalities 
among women is to attempting successful legal initiatives aimed at materially im-
proving the situations of women. She's correct that trying to force consensus is 
wrong. But a feminism that has to wait until everyone is in absolute agreement 
cannot accomplish anything tangible in the interim. Demanding everyone agree 
before any forward progress can occur guarantees that there won't be any. Again, 
the perfect is the enemy of the good. 
Women really aren't all alike, Halley says, (which isn't exactly a radical insight, 
or one she is alone in making, see e.g. MacKinnon on anti-sameness), and making 
laws that assume this, or using laws to foment this, is completely unacceptable. 
Theory creates reality, according to Halley, but it is a reality that can be readily Be 
Taken a Break From, maybe even abandoned with "swoops ofjoy."!3 She skirts (or 
10 Ibid. at 13. 
11 Ibid. at 43. 
12 Ibid. at 80. 
13 Ibid. at 13. 
Vol. 26(2) Book Review: Split Decisiom 395 
pants) the fact that law, or the absence oflaw, creates a very different paradigmatic 
structure than theory. Generalizations are made by political actors, and they are 
addressed either by actions or by calculated inaction. Taking a Break from our 
politico-legal system isn't an option, much as we all might like to just take a break 
from patriarchy and call it a day. 
Halley's theorizing and re-theorizing of theories that are not tethered to con-
crete examples gets a bit obtuse in places. Halley is certainly correct when she 
alleges that no one theory of feminism gets everything right all the time, from 
every perspective. And her detailed analyses of various feminist writings are use-
ful and engaging. But her criticisms of what she terms governance feminism are 
difficult to read and absorb, due to the pairing of an aggressive tone with a paucity 
of specifics. She claims that "[iJf you look around the United States, Canada and 
the European Union, the human rights establishment, even the World Bank, you 
see plenty of places where feminism ... is running things."14 I don't know what 
she is talking about. I wish she'd provided a list of these places, so this claim could 
be fact checked. Where were the feminists in the Bush Administration? Which 
state legislatures are under feminist control? How many public universities have a 
noticeably pro-feminist leadership and agenda, and which ones are they? And are 
they hiring? And finally, what are the criteria by which the leadership of an entity 
qualifies as "feminist"? The lawyer in me wants to know. 
Halley further asserts that "[eJmployers, schools, health care institutions and 
a whole range of entities, often formally "private," govern too-and feminism 
has substantial parts of them under its control." 15 This is one of the places where I 
had to put the book down and walk away for a few minutes to calm down. I invite 
Halley to join me in South Carolina for a while, a couple of months at least, so 
that she can point out all the important institutions here that are under feminist 
control, because I haven't noticed any on my own, to put it mildly. The rate of 
domestic violence here is depressingly high. In the face of data showing 30,000 
incidents of domestic violence in this smallish state each year,16 would she dare 
lecture the local, vocal feminists demanding funding for much needed domestic 
violence shelters about their "bloody hands"? A third of the population of the 
United States resides in The South, a geographically distinct region with a fairly 
pervasive common culture that is not exactly known for being feminist friendly. I 
have no idea if Halley's generalizations are intended to apply to Southerners like 
me. In any event, they do not. I can only imagine how utterly disconnected from 
reality her descriptions of feminist control would seem to enormous sections of 
the world's population. 
Even where Halley addresses particular legal cases, she's pretty vague about 
where Taking a Break From Feminism leaves things. Consider, for example, her 
lengthy deconstruction of the Oncale case.!? Oncale is the case in which the U.S. 
14 Ibid. at 20. 
15Ibid. at 2l. 
16 Samantha Harris, "South Carolina's domestic violence rate highest in the nation: Love doesn't 
hurt" Independent Mail (19 October 2007), online: <http://www.independenrmail.coml 
news/2007 / oct/ 19/ south-carolina-has-highest -rate-deomestic-violence/ >. 
17 Oncale v. Sundowner Offihore Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998) 
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Supreme Court unanimously held that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex 
sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII, which makes certain kinds of 
employment discrimination illegal. According to the Court: 
[Oncale] was employed as a roustabout on an eight-man crew 
which included respondents John Lyons, Danny Pippen, and 
Brandon Johnson. Lyons, the crane operator, and Pippen, 
the driller, had supervisory authority. On several occasions, 
Oncale was forcibly subjected to sex-related, humiliating ac-
tions against him by Lyons, Pippen and Johnson in the pres-
ence of the rest of the crew. Pippen and Lyons also physically 
assulted Oncale in a sexual manner, and Lyons threatened him 
with rape. 
Oncale's complaints to supervisory personnel produced no 
remedial action; in fact, the company's Safety Compliance 
Clerk, Valent Hohen, told Oncale that Lyons and Pippen 
"picked [on] him all the time too," and called him a name sug-
gesting homosexuality. Oncale eventually quit-asking that his 
pink slip reflect that he "voluntarily left due to sexual harass-
ment and verbal abuse." When asked at his deposition why he 
left Sundowner, Oncale stated "I felt that if I didn't leave my 
job, that I would be raped or forced to have sex." [Citations 
omitted]. 
Catharine MacKinnon was one of the lawyers involved in convincing the Court 
that Oncale, ifhis claims were proven, should have a legal remedy. Halley's critical 
response is to assert that the social outcomes of providing him with one might be 
both anti-gay and anti-sex, and "not worth it." But she never tells us for sure. Was 
Oncale entitled to bring his suit or not? Even after explicitly admitting that "de-
ciding not to do anything is doing something," she declines to weigh in. And that 
is a rather stunning cop out. 
Another omission is more troubling. She also fails to credit MacKinnon for 
consulting with and obtaining the support of various gay rights groups in the 
Oncale litigation. Nor does she explain why a number of them signed on to 
MacKinnon's brief MacKinnon's approach in Oncale may not have been perfect, 
but that is not a standard any litigator is ever likely to meet. Halley's account 
of Oncale, and her homophobia charges, have been explicitly and resoundingly 
challenged by legal theorist Marc Spindelman, in his contribution to an essay col-
lection edited by Catharine MacKinnon and Reva Siegel. 18 This part of the book 
would have been stronger and more credible if Halley engaged Spindelman's re-
buttals to her claims. 
I've met people who claim to be feminists, but rather than accomplishing any-
thing productive for women, use their purported feminism as a platform from 
18 Marc Spindelman, "Discriminating Pleasures" in Catharine MacKinnon & Reva Siegel, eds., 
Directions in Sexual Harassment Law (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003) 201. 
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which to criticize others and claim superiority over them. I don't think this ac-
count fairly fits Halley, but I suspect she has been exposed to too many so-called 
feminists for which the description is true. I fear she blames a generalized femin-
ism for the behaviour of a few bad actors. Well, that's my theory, anyway. Like 
Halley, I'm short on supporting specifics. 
I admit this review is a little negative, but I hope it falls far short of the dire 
"ferocious trashing" prediction described above. I don't fear Halley's theories, and 
I'm not afraid Halley's book will derail feminism. It may make a lot of antifemin-
ist men happy, but only until they figure out how little galvanizing impact it is 
likely to have. Halley has an interesting way of disconnecting legal theories from 
the ways in which law is experienced by individuals in their every day lives, but 
I'm optimistic that feminist lawyers will keep helping actual clients with good, 
though not perfect, works, and the world will be a better place in consequence. 
